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In this article I argue that in their current genealogical and philosophical 
configuration, QLR practices—and a wider regime of knowledge, ethical, moral, 
legal, political and economic practices with which they are entangled—embed and 
enact representational assumptions in which the realities being investigated—time, 
change and continuity; the past, present and future—are taken as ontologically given 
and independent of these QLR (and wider) practices. My approach is to conceptualize 
QLR practices along nonrepresentational lines, through a philosophical framework 
that is able to materialize the constitutive effects of QLR (and wider) practices on the 
objects of study and knowledges produced. For this, I turn to Karen Barad’s (2007) 
posthumanist performative metaphysics—‘agential realism’—a framework that 
embodies and enacts a non-classical ontology in which entities are seen as constituted 
through material-discursive practices. On this account, QLR (and their related wider) 
practices are understood as an eliminable and constitutive part of the realities they 
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 1.  Representational configurations of QLR practices  
 
The ‘New frontiers for qualitative longitudinal research (QLR)’ seminar series that 
informs this special issue engaged with ‘the temporal perspectives and norms of 
different academic and practice traditions’ (Thomson et al. 2014, p. 1). It included 
speakers from a range of disciplines and showcased a diversity of practices 
encompassed by the term ‘QLR’ such as: Weis revisiting her own ethnographic study 
of a white working class community in North America after the passage of 20 years; 
Crow undertaking a partial restudy of Ray Pahl’s research of the Isle of Sheppey, UK, 
in the 1970s; Anderson engaged in career-long ethnographic work in a shanty town in 
Lima, Peru; Macmillan and Arvidson exploring organizational change in the UK 
through successive waves of interviews, observations and documentary analysis over 
a three-year period; Morrow’s involvement in an international study of childhood 
poverty over 15 years; and Stanley examining letters and epistolary exchanges in 
South Africa written during the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. 
What these approaches share—and why they and others were brought together 
in a seminar series on QLR—is a concern with time. As Thomson et al. (2003, p. 185) 
point out, ‘What distinguishes longitudinal qualitative research is the deliberate way 
in which temporality is designed into the research process making change a central 
focus of analytic attention.’ QLR practices are therefore understood as providing 
distinctive knowledge about processes of change over time. This in turn is seen as 
yielding insights into the relationship between agency and structure, such as how the 
subject (their identities, beliefs, perspectives, behaviours, practices, narratives) is 
shaped by social and historical processes (including the research process) (Mcleod 
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and Thomson, 2009; McLeod, 2003; Plumridge and Thomson, 2003; Thomson and 
Holland, 2003). As Neale and Flowerdew (2003, p. 190) explain: 
 
It is through time that we can begin to grasp the nature of social change, the 
mechanisms and strategies used by individuals to generate and manage change 
in their personal lives, and the ways in which structural change impacts on the 
lives of individuals. It is only through time that we can gain a better 
appreciation of how the personal and the social, agency and structure, the 
micro and macro are interconnected and how they come to be transformed. It 
was this need to take account of the dynamic nature of people’s lives that led 
to the development of longitudinal research methodologies for, by their very 
nature, these designs embody the notion of time.  
 
On these accounts, QLR takes as its object of study relationships between 
time, change, agency and structure. In grappling with these issues QLR studies deploy 
different theoretical formulations of these concepts. For example, Thomson and 
Holland (2003) distinguish between research time, biographical time, and historical 
time. Neale and Flowerdew (2003, p. 193) problematize the notion of linear time and 
highlight historical, personal, cyclical, situational and spatial time. They suggest that 
‘a multiplicity of times exist in any one social situation and that time itself, the very 
rhythm of our lives, is a cultural construct’. Ontologically, however, QLR practices 
enact time as given and ‘simply there’ in the form of a past, present, and future that 
research participants are negotiating or narrating, and that researchers are studying 
and writing about. Similarly, while different concepts of change, agency and structure 
may be used, the ontological assumption that there are already such things as change, 
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agency and structure is unquestioned. In this historically- and culturally-specific 
genealogical and philosophical configuration, QLR practices enact an ontology of 
given entities. 
It is these kinds of ontological assumptions that provoked and have sustained 
my engagement with philosophical discussions about sociological QLR practices. I 
became involved in these debates in the late 1990s in response to the implicit 
philosophical figuration of QLR practices embedded in the UK’s Economic and 
Social Research Council’s (ESRC) data archiving and reuse policy introduced in 
1996; and in Qualidata, a UK data archive established in 1994 dedicated to the 
preservation and storage of social science qualitative datasets and studies (Mauthner, 
Parry & Backett-Milburn, 1998; Parry & Mauthner, 2004).2 The ESRC was one of the 
first UK research councils to implement a formal data sharing policy, requiring that 
grant applicants demonstrate that data similar to those they were proposing to 
generate did not already exist; and that grant holders offer their research data and 
associated materials for archiving within three months of the end of their project.3 
Qualidata, which was funded by the ESRC, has helped implement the policy and 
provided methodological and ethical guidance. Data management and sharing policies 
have since proliferated across research funding agencies and scientific journals within 
the UK and beyond; as has the creation of social science qualitative data archives. In 
the UK, data management policies have been adopted by Universities as part of their 
research and ethics governance frameworks; and the introduction of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 has ensured that these policies can be legally enforced 
(Mauthner, forthcoming a; Mauthner & Parry, 2013). 
On my reading, this assemblage of mutually constitutive knowledge, ethical, 
moral, legal, political and economic practices has taken on a specific philosophical 
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configuration in which data are understood as representations of realities that are 
independent of the practices through which they are collected, recorded, archived, 
shared and (re)analyzed: 
 
‘a particular, namely ‘realist’, ontological and epistemological position is 
implicit but unacknowledged within discussions of archiving qualitative data. 
Such a position, however, represents only one of many epistemological and 
ontological approaches to qualitative research’. (Mauthner et al., 1998, p. 736) 
 
The assumption embedded and enacted in this ‘regime of practices’ (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 75), that data can be treated independently of their ontological contexts of 
production, has been seen as particularly problematic for qualitative researchers 
working within interpretive and social constructivist traditions for whom data are 
understood as reflexively constituted through historically- and culturally-specific 
practices (Hammersley, 1997, 2010; Mauthner et al., 1998; Parry & Mauthner 2004; 
Savage, 2005).  
These philosophical concerns have been tackled through practices seeking to 
ensure that contextual information is archived alongside the data. This has been 
understood as rendering data (and resultant knowledge) more meaningful by enabling 
researchers to better understand the conditions through which data are generated 
(Corti, 2011). The effect of these practices is to make possible the creation of a new 
object of study: data and the contexts that constitute them (rather than data alone). 
Savage (2005, 2010), for example, takes as his object of investigation the historical 
constitution of classic British sociological studies, including their research practices 
and instruments, and the role these played in producing their objects and knowledges. 
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Others, however, have suggested that restoring the context in which data are 
generated is not necessary because data are autonomous from these contexts and can 
be reconstituted through archival and secondary analysis contexts (Andrews, 2008; 
Bornat, 2003; Moore, 2006, 2007). Moore (2006, p. 28), for instance, suggests that 
‘data can be interpreted in endless contexts, thus opening up the possibilities for 
meaning making’. For these scholars, the object of study is data and the contexts and 
practices through which they are reconstituted. Thomson (2014) sees no need to 
jettison the past in favour of the present suggesting instead that the contexts in which 
data are generated—the research encounter, the theoretical frameworks, the methods, 
the technologies used, the biography of the researchers—are ‘encoded’ in the data and 
can be restaged and renewed upon further analysis. These various approaches to 
(re)contextualizing data take as their object of study data and context, or data-
encoded-with-context. However, they enact data and context as already formed 
entities that shape one another; rather than as entities that are mutually constituted 
through one another. It is in this sense that I have argued that, in their current 
configuration, QLR practices enact an ontological gap between context and data: 
 
‘Whether we contextualise data within the original contexts of ‘data 
production’, the archival contexts of ‘data preservation’, and/or the 
contemporary contexts of ‘data reuse’, ‘data’ are still conceptualised in 
implicit foundational terms in which ‘context’ remains ontologically separate 
from, rather than constitutive of, ‘data’. Both ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodern’ 
arguments, we suggest, are still working with foundational ontological 
conceptions of ‘data’.’ (Mauthner & Parry, 2009, p. 299) 
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Adding context (of any type) to data is understood to help QLR practices give us 
better knowledge of reality, where reality is taken to be independent of these 
practices. It is a past that has already happened or a present that is already made. 
Some authors, such as Savage (2010) and Thomson (2014), suggest that data carry 
traces of their contexts of production and the QLR practices through which they are 
constituted. However, the mechanisms through which context is encoded in data is 
not provided; and no account is given of how QLR practices constitute the past or the 
present. Recognizing the constitutive effects of context, or QLR practices, is not 
enough if these effects—how they make a difference to the object of study and 
knowledge produced—are not accounted for.  
On this approach, QLR practices enact an ontology of given realities by 
overlooking the constitutive nature of practices (or ‘context’). Law (2004) argues that 
this enactment of method relies on largely hidden and commonsense representational 
assumptions about the nature of reality in which the world is understood as given, and 
the practices of knowing are bracketed out and treated as technique. Barad (2007, p. 
53) similarly explains that representationalism ‘marks a failure to take account of the 
practices through which representations are produced’ (Barad, 2007, p. 53). A 
representational conceptualization of knowledge-making practices (methods), she 
suggests, ‘takes the notion of separation as foundational. It separates the world into 
the ontologically disjunct domains of words and things, leaving itself with the 
dilemma of their linkage such that knowledge is possible’ (Barad, 2007, p. 137). 
Drawing on Rouse (1996), Barad further argues that representationalism underpins 
both empirical realism and postmodern philosophical approaches that turn to language 
and discourse, as both share the representational belief that knowledge mediates 
access to the material world (reality). Where they differ is on what they take to be 
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their referent: whereas realist claims are understood to represent things in the world as 
they really are (i.e. nature), social constructivist ones are seen to represent objects that 
are the product of social activities (i.e. culture). Moreover, attempts to acknowledge 
the knower through reflexive approaches are also founded on representationalism in 
that they take for granted the notion that representations reflect (social or natural) 
reality. Reflexivity, Barad suggests, still holds the world at a distance: it ‘is based on 
the belief that practices of representing have no effect on the objects of investigation 
and that we have a kind of access to representations that we don’t have to the objects 
themselves’ (Barad, 2007, p. 87).  
On my account, in their current genealogical and philosophical configuration, 
QLR practices, and the wider assemblage of practices they are part of, are being 
enacted on implicit representational terms. My approach in this article is to 
conceptualize QLR practices along nonrepresentational lines, through a philosophical 
framework that is able to materialize the constitutive effects of QLR (and wider) 
practices on their objects and knowledges of study. For this, I turn to Karen Barad’s 
posthumanist performative metaphysics—‘agential realism’—a framework that 
embodies and enacts a non-classical ontology in which entities are not taken as given 
but as constituted through material-discursive practices. On this account, QLR (and 
wider) practices—through their specific metaphysical, or material-discursive, 
configuration—are an eliminable and constitutive part of the realities (including time, 
change, agency, structure) they help bring into being. I engage with Barad’s work 
here as part of my broader interest in conceptualizing and enacting 
nonrepresentational knowledge-making practices (Mauthner, forthcoming b). On my 
reading, her scholarship provides a distinctive metaphysical framework that can 
materialize, and help reconfigure, the representational ontological assumptions that 
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are embedded and enacted in QLR practices and the wider regime of practices of 
which they are part (see also Mauthner, 2012a, 2012b).4 
 
2. Barad’s posthumanist performative framework: Agential realism  
 
In Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning (2007), North American feminist theorist and physicist Karen Barad 
develops a posthumanist, performative conceptualization of knowledge practices as 
an alternative to representational formulations. While representationalism ignores 
practices of representation, Barad takes the materiality of these practices seriously, 
and suggests that they are constitutive of the objects and knowledges of our 
investigations. Barad is not alone in putting forward a performative understanding of 
the nature of knowledge (and other) practices (e.g. Butler, 1990; Callon, 1998; 
Hacking, 2002; Haraway, 1997; Latour, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Pickering, 
1995; Rheinberger, 1997, Rouse, 1996; Somers, 2008), including the performativity 
of social science methods (e.g. Law, 2004, 2009; Law, Ruppert & Savage, 2011; Law 
and Urry, 2004; Lury & Wakeford, 2012; Ruppert, 2009; Ruppert, Law & Savage, 
2013). Her scholarship resonates with a wider cross-disciplinary turn to ontology (e.g. 
Ingold, 2010; Mol, 2002; Orlikowski, 2010; Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013) and is part of 
a longer genealogy of debates across disciplines such as philosophy, history, and 
anthropology in which questions have been raised about the nature of representational 
practices (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Derrida & Prenowitz, 1995; Munslow, 
1997; White, 1973).  
Barad’s approach, however, is distinctive in its posthumanist orientation and 
its attention to the materiality of practices. As such, her scholarship is part of recent 
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‘new materialist’ approaches in social and feminist theory, and their critical renewed 
orientation towards materiality and processes of materialization in the wake of 
poststructuralism, and its attempt to reject the modernist idea of materiality as ‘brute 
thereness’ (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 7; see also Alaimo & Hekman, 2008). New 
materialist interventions provide a way of understanding the relationship between the 
discursive and the material that does not privilege the former to the exclusion of the 
latter. They build on insights gleaned from the linguistic turn and seek to give “matter 
its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming” (Barad, 2003, p. 803), in 
contrast to approaches that ignore matter, render it passive, or reduce it to social or 
discursive processes. They enact a post-Cartesian ontological reorientation that is 
posthumanist in that it conceives of matter itself as agentive and dynamic. Barad’s 
work, however, further departs from some new materialist attempts to recognize 
material as well as discursive factors in that, as I discuss below, she does not take the 
material and the discursive as given but as ontologically mutually constitutive.  
Barad’s specific conceptualization of the relationship between the material and 
the discursive—and her notion of knowledge practices as inseparably material-
discursive—is inspired by Niels Bohr’s philosophy-physics.5 Barad explains that 
through his own scientific work Bohr developed an understanding of quantum physics 
that led him to reject the metaphysical presuppositions of classical Newtonian physics 
including the central belief that the world is composed of already constituted entities 
and boundaries (nature/culture; matter/meaning; object/subject; knower/known; 
human/nonhuman); and that by implication, we, as knowers, and our scientific 
practices, are separate from the entities that await our discovery. Whereas Newtonian 
physics views the role of measurement as inconsequential, Bohr argued that ‘quantum 
physics requires a new logical framework that understands the constitutive role of 
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measurement processes in the construction of knowledge’ (2007, p. 67). Bohr 
proposed that the world is inherently ontologically indeterminate in the absence of 
specific scientific or measurement practices:  
 
‘there is something fundamental about the nature of measurement interactions 
such that, given a particular measuring apparatus, certain properties become 
determinate, while others are explicitly excluded. Which properties become 
determinate is not governed by the desires or will of the experimenter but 
rather by the specificity of the experimental apparatus’ (Barad, 2007, p. 19).  
 
Bohr understood apparatuses, or measurement processes, as physical-
conceptual devices that embody, materialize, and give meaning to specific concepts to 
the exclusion of others. Critically, Bohr understood concepts as specific material 
arrangements of experimental apparatuses—and not as abstract ideations or inherent 
attributes of independently existing objects. For Bohr, a concept only has meaning 
when a specific physical apparatus is used to measure it: ‘concepts are meaningful, 
that is, semantically determinate, not in the abstract but by virtue of their embodiment 
in the physical arrangement of the apparatus’ (Barad, 2007, p. 117). Bohr argued that 
our ability to understand the world was dependent on taking into account the fact that 
our knowledge-making practices are ‘social-material enactments that contribute to, 
and are part of, the phenomena we describe’ (2007, p. 26). This profound insight led 
Bohr to the view that ‘we are part of that nature that we seek to understand’ (2007, p. 
67). 
Barad (2007) builds on Bohr’s ‘proto-performative’ formulation of the 
apparatus, and particularly his critical insight about the materiality of concepts, and 
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brings his ideas into conversation with those from science studies, the philosophy of 
science, postructuralism, and feminist and queer theory; including the work of 
Haraway (Barad, 1996), Butler and Foucault (Barad, 1998), and Derrida (Barad, 
2010). She proposes a posthumanist account of performativity that challenges the 
positioning of materiality as either a given or the result of human, social or discursive 
processes. On her account, discursive practices are not human-based activities—
linguistic or signifying systems, speech acts, conversations, statements, or utterances 
of an intentional and unified subject. They are ‘specific material (re)configurings of 
the world through which the determination of boundaries, properties, and meanings is 
differentially enacted’ (2007, p. 148). Just as discursive practices are always already 
material (they are an ongoing materialization of the world), so too materiality is 
discursive: material phenomena come into being through, and are inseparable from, 
discursive practices. As Barad (2014, p. 175) explains: ‘Meaning is not an ideality; 
meaning is material. And matter isn’t what exists separately from meaning. Mattering 
is a matter of what comes to matter and what doesn’t’. In Barad’s metaphysics, 
materiality is dynamic and agentive, refigured as materialization. It has ‘ongoing 
historicity’ (Barad, 2003, p. 821) and is an active factor in processes of 
materialization. Materiality is a doing rather than a thing: ‘Matter refers to the 
materiality and materialization of phenomena, not to an assumed, inherent, fixed 
property of abstract, independently existing objects’ (2007, p. 210).  
Barad’s work departs from many existing attempts to move beyond 
representationalism and Cartesianism in that she does not merely suggest that there 
are important material factors to consider in addition to discursive ones in the 
production of knowledge. Nor does she explore the relationship between the 
human/semiotic and nonhuman/material through the concept of inter-action, which 
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presupposes that these terms are separate to begin with. Rather, Barad starts from a 
relational ontology in which the material and the semiotic, the nonhuman and the 
human, are always already ontologically entangled and inseparable. She proposes the 
neologism, ‘intra-action’, to rethink the relationship between the material and the 
semiotic and to rework the traditional concept of causality and notion of inter-action. 
Intra-actions are performative causal enactments that materialise entities and 
boundaries out of ontologically inseparable relations. According to Barad, it is only 
through specific ‘agential intra-actions’ that ‘entities’ (bodies, meanings) and 
boundaries are produced, and become determinate and meaningful. Practices enact 
what Barad terms ‘agential cuts, which do not produce absolute separations, but rather 
cut together-apart (one move)’ (Barad, 2014, p. 168). Barad’s approach makes it 
possible to step out of a representational framework by foregrounding, rather than 
bracketing, the knowledge-making practices through which material-discursive 
realities are (intra-actively) performed into being.  
In seeking to develop a methodological practice for enacting a posthumanist 
performative metaphysics, Barad draws on the physical phenomenon of diffraction. 
Building on Haraway’s (1992, 1997) suggestion of embracing a different optics in 
science studies—diffraction rather than reflection—and on a longer genealogy of the 
concept of diffraction threaded through quantum physics and feminist theory (Barad, 
2014)—Barad proposes that we think of knowledge practices in terms of ‘diffraction 
apparatuses of bodily production’ (see also Mauthner, forthcoming b). Diffraction, 
she suggests, does not fix what is the object and what is the subject in advance. On 
this account, ‘knowing does not come from standing at a distance and representing 
but rather from a direct material engagement with the world’ (Barad, 2007, p. 49). 
Knowledge practices are non-innocent, performative practices that are a constitutive 
  13 
and ineliminable part of what is being described/produced, and therefore need to be 
accounted for. Working in a diffractive way requires specifying the metaphysical 
conditions and constraints through which we engage/with/as-part-of the world.  
 
3. Diffracting sociological QLR practices through agential realism 
 
I now re-turn to QLR practices, and the ontological issues they raise, by diffracting 
these practices through agential realism. The concept of ‘QLR’ encompasses a 
multitude of practices—including data generating, recording, archiving, searching, 
analyzing and revisiting—each of which is entangled with wider knowledge, ethical, 
moral, legal, political, and economic practices. Each one of these, and other related, 
practices could be diffracted through agential realism to examine their 
representational assumptions. Due to space constraints, however, I focus my 
discussion specifically on revisiting practices as enacted in the work of two British 
sociologists—Mike Savage and Liz Stanley—both of whom have produced 
significant bodies of work through practices of revisiting ‘the past’; and both of 
whom, on my reading, seek to grapple with the philosophical issues raised by QLR, 
including revisiting, practices. My diffractive reading of their work entails taking 
agential realism as my agency of observation and their revisiting practices as my 
object of study in order to investigate the metaphysical assumptions enacted in their 
practices. The question I bring to their work is: How is the ontological nature of 
revisiting practices, and the relationship of these practices to both the object of study 
and the knowledge that is produced, conceptualized and enacted? Specifying the 
metaphysical framework that underpins my question, and through which I examine 
their practices, is an enactment of a diffractive practice. It details the metaphysical—
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material-semiotic—specificity of the reading practices through which I approach 
Savage’s and Stanley’s revisiting practices. It provides the material conditions and 
constraints necessary to materialize a determinate and meaningful agentially enacted 
boundary between agential realist and representational conceptualizations and 
enactments of revisiting practices. In this sense, the practices through which I engage 
with the work of Savage and Stanley illustrate the argument I make in this article: 
‘my’ diffractive practices enact an agential realist conceptualization of knowledge-
making by taking ‘my’ agential realist practices as an ineliminable and constitutive 
part of the representational practices ‘my’ practices help bring into being.  
Mike Savage (2005, 2010) addresses the philosophical issues raised by QLR 
practices by turning to history and investigating the historical processes, research 
practices and material devices through which a number of ‘classic’ British 
sociological studies—undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s—were shaped by the social 
world in which they were located, and in turn helped to shape social realities. For 
example, in his book, Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940: The Politics 
of Method (2010), Savage explains that his initial intention was to use archived data 
from these classic post-war sociological studies to investigate social change in Britain 
after the Second World War. However, he realized that the social science methods 
that were used to generate these data were contributing to the remaking of national 
identities, his object of study: ‘The processes by which knowledge—in the form of 
assumptions, tools, data, methods, and accounts—is generated is itself of great 
interest in understanding the nature of popular identities themselves’ (2010, p. xii). 
His book turned into a historical sociology of the social sciences in Britain, as his 
object of study shifted from popular identities to the ‘social science apparatus’ that 
produced, and came into being at the same time as, these identities.  
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 While Savage suggests that turning to historical practices overcomes realist 
assumptions embedded within QLR practices, his historical practices enact the very 
same assumptions that are the object of his critique. One example of this is his 
argument that a historical approach reveals how research was ‘really’ conducted: 
 
‘We need to use archival sources to reconstruct, as best we can, the research 
process itself so that we can get inside the research ‘boiler room’ to see how 
distinctive kinds of social objects and relationships are generated’. (Savage, 
2010, p. 16) 
 
‘Archived qualitative data can be used to reconstruct how “classic” research 
studies were actually conducted so that we are better able to understand how 
research actually advances.’ (Savage, 2005, [3]) 
 
Close scrutiny of fieldnotes, Savage suggests, can reveal ‘what really pre-occupied’ 
researchers (Savage, 2005, [15]). Taken alongside the published outputs from a study, 
fieldnotes can also make apparent how lines of investigation made particular objects 
and knowledges present, to the exclusion of others. Savage calls this reading history 
‘against the grain’ and he sees this as a key potential of qualitative data archives. 
Archives, her argues, expose how the making of knowledge is not a neutral process: 
‘we can understand the visibilities and invisibilities—and therefore the implicit 
politics of social research which often gains its power and pertinence through keeping 
its own processes invisible’ (Savage, 2005, [6]).  
  Savage takes as his object of study the performativity of knowledge practices 
and the social science apparatus (see also Savage, 2013; Law, Ruppert & Savage, 
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2011). Paradoxically, however, he treats this object in a representational way by 
failing to specify the practices through which he revisits the past, and their 
performative role in constituting his own object. His practices therefore enact this 
object as ontologically given: a past that is already formed and that actually happened. 
While he makes a strong argument for treating the research practices he studies as an 
ineliminable part of the objects and knowledge that are produced, he does not extend 
this to his own practices. This is despite his critique of dominant instrumentalist 
approaches to methods in the social sciences (Savage, 2013) for the way they ‘hide 
their own traces’ (Savage, 2010, p. 8) and enact an implicit politics in doing so—a 
metaphysics and politics his revisiting practices implicitly enact. Similarly, Savage 
(2009) argues that concepts of change are historically and culturally-contingent, 
produced in part by the social science apparatus. However, he does not account for 
how the concept of change enacted in his own practices—his rejection of a 
teleological approach—is constituted by the social science apparatus and in turn helps 
constitute his object of study—e.g. the emergence and rise of the social sciences in 
the second half of the twentieth century (Savage, 2010). His own revisiting practices 
therefore enact the nature of change as given.   
My second example is Liz Stanley’s extensive programme of collaborative 
longitudinal qualitative research exploring the question of how a minority of whites 
imposed itself on a black majority in South Africa through the institutionalization of a 
race-based system of power and exploitation. Her key object of study are the 
epistolary practices of individuals and networks of different ethnic, political, 
economic and religious standing across two centuries (1770s—1970s): letter-writing 
networks spread through time and space. Stanley’s practices are informed by the 
feminist theory of knowledge and grounded research practice she developed called 
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‘Feminist Fractured Foundationalism’ (FFF) (Stanley & Wise, 1993).  FFF was a 
response to feminist research of the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in the UK, which 
Stanley and Wise saw as reproducing positivist methodological approaches in which 
women were taken as object of study and the power-laden ‘act of knowing’ was 
concealed. This, they argued, created an untenable division between the knower 
(‘academic women’) and the known (‘ordinary women’). FFF seeks to move beyond 
the binaries (cultural/material, realism/idealism, theory/practice) inherent in these 
practices. It recognizes the materiality of the social world that is real in its 
consequences (foundationalism) and its socially interpreted and culturally constructed 
aspects (fractured) (Stanley & Wise, 1993, 2006). On this account, there is ‘a real 
social reality … to be arrived at’ (Stanley & Wise, 2006) and knowledge practices are 
understood as providing partial understandings of this reality rather than 
representations of reality as it really is. This philosophical approach to revisiting the 
past, and its relationship to the object of study, is enacted in Stanley and Wise’s 
(2006) discussion of the death of a young girl in one of the concentration camps of the 
South African War (1899-1902). Letters, official records and other documents, they 
argue, suggest that the circumstances surrounding her death were the object of dispute 
at the time and that: 
 
‘One of the features of historical research is that in a sense such disputes are 
“over” now, and so the temptation to take sides is less than in present-time 
research. That is, there is no possibility here of the researcher ‘intervening’ 
other than by suggesting interpretational possibilities.’ (Stanley & Wise, 2006, 
2.19). 
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On this approach, the dispute and the past are already gone and have already 
happened—they are ontologically given—and all the researcher can do is provide a 
perspective on these events. Whereas agential realism takes the past as open to 
nonarbitrary remaking, FFF treats the past as already made.  
The epistolary practices that are the object of study are conceptualized in 
similar epistemological and ontological terms. Stanley refers to the performative 
feature of letters (Stanley, 2013, Stanley, Salter & Dampier’s 2013, p. 299) and notes 
that ‘what happened’ (reality, history, time) is neither given nor absolute. Stanley 
seems to suggest that the ontological nature of letters, and the historical events they 
describe, is made rather than found. However, on my reading, Stanley is making an 
epistemological rather than an ontological point. She suggests that the meaning of a 
letter or a historical event is open to different interpretations. As she says, there is no 
single version of events, and letters provide perspectival representations of these 
events, shaped by historical happenings and personal circumstances. Through their 
seriality and succession, letters do not open up ‘‘the past’ itself, long dead and gone, 
but … changing views and representations of what was the unfolding present for the 
people who wrote them’ (Stanley, 2013). Stanley draws on Norbert Elias’s notion of 
‘sociogenesis’ and suggests that QLR allows us to grasp reality as a complex and 
continuous process of social becoming by giving us access to representations of 
reality across space and time (in the form of letter-writing networks). This provides 
insights into how reality’s becoming is shaped by local and interpersonal, micro-level 
and the macro-level processes. However, the notion that the ontological nature of 
reality is characterized by sociogenesis is taken as given. Similarly, Stanley’s 
practices enact letters and historical events as having an ontological existence that is 
independent of the multiple practices through which these letters and events are 
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constituted. 
Reading Stanley’s work through agential realism materializes patterns of 
resonance and dissonance. Like Barad (2007), Stanley and Wise argue that the act of 
knowing is not neutral and needs to be accounted for. Feminist social scientists, they 
suggest, ‘must acknowledge the ethical and political issues involved in what we do, 
how we do it and the claims we make for it’ (Stanley & Wise, 1993, p. 7). However, 
while Stanley and Wise suggest that researchers take responsibility for the knowledge 
they produce Barad argues that we are accountable and responsible for the realities 
our practices help bring into being (see below). Furthermore, reading Stanley’s work 
through agential realism materializes the representational assumptions embedded and 
enacted in her revisiting practices and their exclusion of the constitutive nature of 
practices of representation—both the epistolary practices that are her object of study 
and her own revisiting practices. That is, Stanley does not account for how letters or 
historical events are ontologically constituted by micro-level and macro-level 
processes (Stanley, 2013), including the revisiting practices through which they are 
performed into being. Reading Savage’s and Stanley’s work through an agential 
realist framework helps materialize their revisiting practices as representational 
enactments that exclude the constitutive nature of practices—both their own practices 
and the practices they study.  
 
4. Towards an agential realist configuration of QLR practices  
 
Following Barad, addressing the philosophical issues raised by QLR practices in a 
determinate and meaningful way requires specifying our metaphysical commitments. 
In this paper I have addressed these issues on agential realist terms through 
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metaphysical practices that enact a boundary between agential realism and its 
constitutive other: representationalism. On an agential realist approach, this practice 
of accounting for our metaphysical commitments is what secures (an agential realist 
redefinition of) ‘objectivity’, where ‘objectivity is about being accountable to the 
specific materializations of which we are a part’ (Barad, 2007, p. 91). The cut 
between agential realism and representationalism is not understood as innocent or 
given. It is performative: it enacts culturally- and historically-specific material-
discursive phenomena (objects, meanings, boundaries) and is a material-discursive 
effect of the culturally- and historically-specific metaphysical framework of agential 
realism. As Barad (1996, p. 187) explains, in shifting and destabilizing 
representational and Cartesian subject-object / culture-nature boundaries, our ‘goal 
should not be to find less false boundaries for all spacetime, but reliable, accountable, 
located temporary boundaries’, that will serve for some of our purposes for a while 
but ‘which we should anticipate will quickly close in against us. Agential realism will 
inevitably be a casualty of its own design’. 
Putting metaphysics to one side, failing to specify our philosophical 
commitments, and avoiding the enactment of boundaries are not neutral practices. 
They implicitly enact representational commitments by failing to account for 
themselves. On an agential realist approach, QLR practices are metaphysical practices 
that necessarily enact specific metaphysical commitments to the exclusion of others. 
There is no outside of metaphysics, and the point is, following Barad, to specify our 
metaphysics, account for and take responsibility for the cuts it enacts, and include this 
metaphysics as ontologically inherent to, and productive of, the objects and 
knowledges constituted through QLR practices. On this account, QLR practices in 
their current configuration raise philosophical questions not simply because of their 
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enactment of a representational metaphysics but because of their failure to make this 
metaphysics explicit. As Somers (2008, p. 172-3) argues, many of the problems we 
face in sociology stem from the fact that we have taken the concepts that inform our 
work as given and presuppositional. These concepts implicitly frame our research 
problematics, and shape and delimit our knowledge practices, such as how we think, 
what we do, and the questions we ask. Making apparent ‘those self-evidences on 
which our knowledges, acquiescences and practices rest’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 76) 
materialises them as ‘contingent historical outcomes [that] simply take on the 
appearance of being the only possible reality’ (Somers, 2008, p. 10).  
On my reading, Barad’s distinctive insistence on accounting and taking 
responsibility for the metaphysical specificity of our knowledge practices—and their 
performative effects—provides a potentially fruitful way forward for how we debate, 
conceptualize and enact QLR practices. This is particularly the case in light of 
commentators who suggest that the philosophical questions seen to arise from QLR 
practices are unwarranted because these practices are neither new nor specific to the 
discipline of sociology (Geiger et al., 2010; Moore, 2007). As already suggested, 
there are well-established traditions in which sociologists undertake secondary 
analysis, archival work, intergenerational research and revisits of classic studies; 
anthropologists return to their ethnographic fieldsites and fieldnotes over time; oral 
historians create archival documents; and historians use archives as source materials 
(Holland, Thomson & Henderson, 2006; Thomson et al., 2014). The point being made 
by highlighting the links between the latter traditions and QLR practices is an 
epistemological one: it suggests that ways of knowing the world that are ‘attentive to 
temporal processes and durational phenomena’ (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 2) have 
long, cross-disciplinary, genealogies.  
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The argument I make, however, is an ontological one that applies equally to 
these other disciplines and traditions, and their genealogy of representational 
ontological practices (see also Derrida & Prenowitz, 1995; Ingold, 2010). 
Furthermore, my argument is also political in that it is concerned with the ways in 
which a wider regime of practices enacts, institutionalizes, and takes as given a 
culturally- and historically-specific ontological configuration of QLR practices 
(Mauthner, 2012a, 2012b, 2014); and derives power from its ability to materialize this 
specific configuration as a now principal component of the nature of social scientific 
practice, thus coming to seem ‘an altogether natural, self-evident and indispensable 
part of it’ (Foucault, 1991). Following Foucault and Barad, it is possible to contest 
and shake ‘this false self-evidence’, demonstrate its precariousness, make ‘visible not 
its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical 
processes’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 75). On this approach, the specific representational 
configuration of current QLR (and related) practices is not given. It is the effect of 
processes of formation that can be non-innocently traced, contested, and remade. This 
means that QLR practices are open to being reconfigured along nonrepresentational, 
posthumanist performative lines in which QLR is reframed as an ontological—or, to 
be more precise, ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ (Barad, 2007, p. 185)—rather than an 
epistemological project: a project that is no longer concerned with how QLR practices 
help us know or understand time, change, and continuity where these are taken as 
given; but rather investigates, accounts, and takes responsibility for how QLR 
practices, in intra-action with a wider asssemblage of practices, help make time, 
change, and continuity and with what specific performative (material-discursive) 
effects.  
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Notes 
 
1. Barad (2010, p. 260). 
2. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is the UK's leading 
research and training agency addressing economic and social concerns.  
3.  For the current ESRC Research Data Policy see: 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Research_Data_Policy_2010_tcm8-4595.pdf. 
4.  There are different readings and enactments of Barad’s work. My own account 
is informed by my readings of her scholarship and my interest in developing 
nonrepresentational conceptualizations and enactments of methods and knowledge 
practices. 
5. Barad’s interpretation of quantum physics, and of Bohr’s work, is but one of 
many readings. As Barad (2014, p. 186) notes: ‘My account of Bohr’s philosophy-
physics … is not faithful to Bohr (as if it could be), but rather is always already 
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